Saturday, 12 March 2016

M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1806 and 1884 OF 2011

HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO
M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1806 and 1884 OF 2011
JUDGMENT:
          The appellant-claimant filed MACMA No.1806 of 2011, filed this appeal having been aggrieved by the Order/Award of the learned Chairman of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal–cum- District Judge, Srikakulam,(for short, ‘Tribunal’) in M.V.O.P.No.388 of 2009 dated 21.03.2011, awarding compensation of Rs.4,32,300/-(Rupees four lakh thirty two thousand three hundred only) with interest at 7.5% p.a. as against the claim of the claimant of Rs.7,00,000/-(Rupees seven lakh only), contending that the Tribunal awarded only Rs.4,32,000/- with interst at 7.5%p.a. awarded  dated ----- to allow the appeal by enhancing the claim as prayed for in the claim petition and in the said grounds of appellant it is the submission that the taking of the earning of the deceased even Kousi--- proved from evidence only at Rs.75/- per day and Rs.20250/- per month is contray utterly low and deducted multiplier 16 is incorrect. Hence, to increase whereas it is the contention of the insurer contesting 2nd respondent to the claim petition as well as the appeal for 1st respondent served in contesting have been remained exparte before the Tribunal even, that this Court whle sitting in appeal the is nothing to interfere but for if at all reduce the quantum, no cross-appeal and that the multiple adopted and the earnings estimated by the Tribunal are just so also disability arrived  rate of interest hence to dismiss the appeal. . the compensation awarded is high impugning the  thirty two thousand three hundred only) with interest at 7.5% p.a. as against the claim of the claimant of Rs.7,00,000/-(Rupees seven lakh only),  in the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’).
2. Heard Sri P.Harinath Gupta, the learned standing counsel for the appellant-insurance company.  Sri V.Ram Chandar Rao, counsel for  1st respondent-claimant and the appeal against 2nd respondent-driver of crime vehicle and 3rd respondent-owner dismissed for default vide orders dated 25.01.2010. Perused the material on record. The parties hereinafter are referred to as arrayed before the Tribunal for the sake of convenience in the appeal.

Another appeal MACMA No.1884 of 2011 is filed by the appellant-National Insurance Company Limited-2nd respondent in the same O.P.No.338 of 2009 having been aggrieved by the Order/Award with the contentions in the grounds of appeal as well as oral submissions in nutshell are that the order and decree of the Tribunal is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and compensation awarded is high together with interest, failed to know that the Insurance policy in question (Ex.B.1) is issued for goods carrying commercial vehicle and the respondent/petitioner was a gratuitous and unauthorized passenger sitting in said load, fell down and sustained injuries,  that the insurance policy is issued to a tractor and trailer which is a goods carrying commercial vehicle having seating capacity of one person in the driver seat. Apart from the driver no other person is permissible to sit or travel in the goods carrying commercial vehicle. So the petitioner is unauthorized and gratuitous passenger forwhich no premium is paid bythe respondent-insured, that failed tonote that the respondent/petitioner is not a third party totheaccident and erronerously saddled him with an award ofRs.4,32,000/- third party means who have not traveled in the vehicle,  that the evidence ofR.W.1-A.O. of appellant company clearly points that insurance policy is issued to goods carrying commercial vehicle , crime vehicle driver did not have valid driving licence, seating capacity of tractor-trailor is only one personi.e. driver, tractor-trailor was carrying respondent/petitioner at the time of accident for hire and reward, which isnot permissible as per terms of policy, the petitioner was an unauthorized passenger, that R.W.2 also deposed the asame and further deposed as no specific endorsement in the Ex.B.5-driving licence to drive the tractor and trailer, that failed to note that no proof of income and occupation has been filed by the respondent/petitioner there is no even jthird party affidavit ofhis employer that the respondent/petitioner is working as a loading and unloading coolie with respondent insured, that the collection of premium for risk of coolies is only for liading and unloading operations and not for unlawfuly allowing them to travel in the goods vehicles, that the owner of the goods alone can travel in the vehicle with his goods, that the respondent/petitioner has not examined the treating doctor who is alleged to have done amputation of his right arm. What prevented respondent/petitioner to examine the doctor who has carried out amputation of his right arm isnot known? Strangely the respondent/petitioner got examined P.W.2(Dr.B.Uday Kumar) who has not done amputation of the respondent right arm and much worse P.W.2 and also issued a disability certificate  that ought to have exonerated the appellant as it held that the R.1-driver is not having valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident which is a clear violation of conditions of policy and the award is unsustainable in law and the same is liable to be set aside and the compensation is excessive.

           
4. Now the points that arise for consideration in the appeal are:
1.    Whether the award of the Tribunal fastening joint liability on the insurer with insured to indemnify the insured for the claimant(s) and requires interference by this Court while sitting in the appeal?
2.    Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not just and requires interference by this Court and if so with what extent and against whom with what rate of interest with what observations?
3.    To what result?
POINT-1:
          The fact that the accident was the result of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the same crime tractor trailer AP30 U 1367-3766 of claim petition 1st respondent-insurer with the claim petition 2nd respondent Ex.B.1 policy not in dispute. So also the fact that the vehicle got registered and permit and the driver got licence covered by Exs.B.2 to 5 and evidence of R.Ws.1 and 2  as per the  P.W.6 the worker cum—driver with a tractor and trailer for loading and unloading even otherwise there is a premium paid additional in addition to the driver of the tractor to say he is otherwise only say attendant of the goods which  is admittedly with a sand load and the goods vehicle from Ex.B.2 permit, read with B.1 police and B.3 registration extract evidence of R.Ws.1 and 2.


5.The facts are that on 21.11.1999 the claimant-minor boy by name Ravikumar was at the bus stop of Duddenapalli and the petitioner while crossing road the 1st respondent-driver of the crime vehicle-Suzuki motor cycle bearing No. AP-15-H-9340 came riding in rash and negligent manner from Karimnagar side and dashed against the claimant, due to which the claimant fell down and sustained grievous injuries, immediately he was shifted to Government hospital, Karimnagar and then to M.G.M.Hospital, Warangal for treatment and said occurrence is covered by Ex.A.1 FIR and Ex.A.3 charge sheet. The Tribunal basing on the oral and documentary evidence on record, taking into consideration of all aspects in all awarded compensation of Rs.19,000/- with interest at 9%p.a. against respondent Nos.1 to 3 to be entitled by the claimant.
6.The fact that the accident was the result of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the crime vehicle- crime vehicle-Suzuki motor cycle bearing No. AP-15-H-9340 insured with the 3rd respondent in claim petition covered by Ex.B-1 policy is proved from the evidence of PW.1 with reference to Ex.A-1 FIR and Ex.A-3 charge sheet.  Thus the only thing to be seen is whether the appellant is to be exonerated from the liability to pay compensation. In this regard, on perusal of the award, the Tribunal held that though the appellant herein got examined his employee as R.W.1 who deposed as 1st respondent-driver of the crime vehicle is not having valid driving licence at the time of accident and the same is also mentioned in Ex.A.3 charge sheet, the same is not a conclusive proof and appellant herein failed to prove that the 1st respondent-driver is not having valid licence at the time of accident. This court also does not require any interference with above finding of the Tribunal as Ex.A.3 charge sheet cannot itself be a basis as per the settled expressions in the absence of proof like summoning the RTO or driver or owner, however, no efforts made by the Insurer at least by giving notice to the driver and owner to bring the driving licence, the same is rightly held by the Tribunal. Hence, this Court confirms the joint liability on respondents as held by the Tribunal in view of no proof of driving licence of the 1st respondent-driver at the time of accident. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered.   
POINT No.2:
7. Coming to decide the dispute on quantum as to what is just compensation in the factual matrix of the case, it is apt to state that perfect compensation is hardly possible and money cannot renew a physique or frame that has been battered and shattered, nor relieve from a pain suffered as stated by Lord Morris. In Ward v. James[1], it was observed by Lord Denning that award of damages in personal injury cases is basically a conventional figure derived from experience and from awards in comparable cases. Thus, in a case involving loss of limb or its permanent inability or impairment, it is difficult to say with precise certainty as to what compensation would be adequate to sufferer. The reason is that the loss of a human limb or its permanent impairment cannot be measured or converted in terms of money. The object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the victim or his or her legal representatives due to sudden demise. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule in measuring the value of human life or limb or sufferance and the measure of damage cannot be arrived at, by precise mathematical calculation, but amount recoverable depends on facts and circumstances of each case. Upjohn LJ in Charle red House Credit v. Tolly[2] remarked that the assessment of damages has never been an exact science and it is essentially practical. Lord Morris in Parry v. Cleaver[3] observed that to compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult without some guess work but no other process can be devised than that of making a monitory assessment though it is impossible to equate the money with the human sufferings or personal deprivations. The Apex Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Private Limited[4] at paragraph No.12 held that in its very nature whatever a Tribunal or a Court is to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused.  But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standard. Thus, in most of the cases involving Motor Accidents, by looking at the totality of circumstances, an inference may have to be drawn and a guess work has to be made even regarding compensation in case of death, for loss of dependent and estate to all claimants; care, guidance, love and affection especially of the minor children, consortium to the spouse, expenditure incurred in transport and funerals etc., and in case of injured from the nature of injuries, pain and sufferance, loss of earnings particularly for any disability and also probable expenditure that has to be incurred from nature of injuries sustained and nature of treatment required.
8. In this regard, it is well laid down by the Apex Court (Three Judges Bench) in the latest expression in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh[5] at paras-1 and 7 referring to the earlier expressions in Sarla Verma v Delhi Transport Corporation[6] and Nagappa v Gurudayal Singh[7] that compensation which appears to it to be just, has to be assessed and awarded by the Tribunal set up under Section 166 of the Act. The expression ‘just compensation’ has been explained in Sarla Verma`s case (cited supra) holding that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal does not become just compensation merely because the Tribunal considered it to be just. ‘Just compensation’ is an adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. 
9. In view of the above legal propositions and factual matrix, what the Tribunal in fact awarded Rs.19,000/- under different heads basing on the evidence of P.W.1 and Ex.A.8 Discharge summery card and considering other aspects is just and reasonable and the said awarding of quantum of compensation by the Tribunal does not require any interference by this  Court while sitting in appeal if not to say it is low and even then for no cross appeal; this Court has no right to enhance the compensation as laid down by the Apex Court in Ranjana Prakash V. Divisional Manager[8] in categorical terms that in the appeal filed by insurer or driver as the case may be, the claimant but for to support the quantum on one ground or other, has no right to ask for enhancement of compensation so also the appellate authority even under Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C to enhance in absence of independent appeal or cross objections. 
10. Coming to the rate of interest, the Tribunal awarded interest at 9% p.a.  From the settled proposition of law in TN Transport Corporation v. Raja Priya[9], and Rajesh (supra); that while awarding reasonable rate of interest the steep fall in the bank interest rate since past several years has to be kept in mind and awarded therefrom interest at 7.5% p.a. as reasonable.  The appellate Court also got the discretionary power under Order LXI Rule 33 C.P.C to award reasonable rate of interest from the drastic fall in bank rate of interest in bank rate as laid down by the Apex Court in DDA Vs. Joginder S. Monga[10].  Thus under Section 171 of the MVAct interest is reduced from 9%p.a. to 7.5% p.a. from date of claim petition till realization.  Accordingly, Point-2 for consideration is answered.
POINT -3:
11. Accordingly and in the result, the appeal is dismissed and the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal of 9% p.a. is reduced to 7.5% p.a. from date of the claim petition till realization/deposit with notice. The Respondent Nos.1 to 3, who are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, are directed to deposit within one month said amount with interest from the date of petition, failing which the claimant can execute and recover.  On such deposit or execution and recovery, the claimant is permitted to withdraw the same. There is no order as to costs in the appeal.
12. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this appeal, shall stand closed.

_______________________
               Dr. B. SIVA SANKARA RAO, J

Date: 02-01-2014
Vvr

Note:   L.R. copy to be marked    yes/no
          (b/o) Vvr       




[1] 1965(1) All. E.R-563
[2] 1963(2) All.E.R-432
[3] 1969(1)All.E.R –555
[4] 1995 ACJ 366(SC)
[5] 2013 ACJ 1403=(4)ALT-35(SC).
[6] 2009 ACJ 1298.
[7] 2003 ACJ 12.                                                                                                                
[8] 2011(8) SCALE 240
[9] (2005) 6 SCC 236
[10] (2004)2 SCC-297